All the sides, no middle ground
Amnon Kapeljiouk
Haaretz, 27 December 2002
"Le Reve Brise: Histoire de l'echec du processus du paix au Proche-Orient 1995-2002" by Charles Enderlin, Fayard, 366 pages, 20 Euros, forthcoming in February, 2003 in English as `Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East 1995-2002,' Other Press LLC, 308 pages, $28
This book deals mainly with the Camp David summit (July, 2000), the most traumatic event in Israeli-Palestinian relations after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. More studies have yet to be written about what happened there, what was supposed to have happened there but did not, and what did not occur there but has been presented as definite fact.
The book is a kind of report. There is hardly a sentence in it that expresses any sort of opinion, decided or hesitant, offered by the author. He does not act as judge, but rather as the moderator of a discussion. There are two sides, each with its own facts and justifications, and these are presented here in sequence as articulated by the main players themselves, Palestinians and Israelis. There are also American and French participants, and a Norwegian who is remembered for his positive contribution. The writer only gives them the opportunity to speak, but intelligently.
The book could have been entitled "All the Quotations from Camp David." They fill the book; sometimes without a break over several consecutive pages. It is easy to discern this quickly by just browsing through the book, as the quotations are printed in a different type-face from the rest of the text and the reading flows. It is possible to finish reading the book within a day or two.
The author, Charles Enderlin, is known to every Frenchman from his reports on the second channel of French (public) television. He has been reporting regularly from Jerusalem, for over 10 years, on events in Israel and the occupied and autonomous territories, and earns praise for his skill and reliability. French-speakers here often turn to "Charles' channel" in order to know a bit more, both about the event and the background: information without propaganda.
Enderlin's book had its origins in television. The writer, who followed the peace process, made a three-hour documentary film (soon to be screened here as well, unless someone gets cold feet) with interviews that were conducted in real time. He had direct access to almost all the main characters in the tragedy of Camp David and they deposited the secrets of the negotiations into his video camera. The trust in him was so great that the office of France 2 in Jerusalem often served as a meeting place for secret talks, as related in the book (between Gilad Sher and Saeb Erekat, for example). When he accumulated a great deal of valuable material, Enderlin saw fit to write it all down. "Shattered Dream" became a best-seller in France and earned enthusiastic reviews from journalists and public figures, among them former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine.
Jerusalem, the key
Former prime minister Ehud Barak, who was primarily responsible for the failure at Camp David that brought upon us what happened afterward - the rift with the Palestinians, their impetus for the intifada, Ariel Sharon's rise to power in Israel and the collapse of the Oslo agreements - left a basic question behind him: At that summit, did he really want to test whether Israel had a partner on the other side, or was he trying to prove, right from the moment he expressed the idea of solving within two weeks a conflict that has been going on for 100 years, because, as was bruited immediately thereafter, he really did not want peace?
Enderlin's documentation teaches above all, and clearly, what in fact was known even before the summit began: Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat did not want to come to such a crucial meeting without preparation. He asked former U.S. president Bill Clinton for at least one thing - that he not be blamed if the summit failed. Clinton promised, but as everyone remembers he did not keep this promise.
The discussions at the summit developed in such a way - inevitably - that the question of Jerusalem was the key to their success or failure. Barak's proposals spoke of a foothold, without sovereignty, for the Palestinians in some of the neighborhoods in the Jerusalem "envelope." All that Barak proposed with respect to this fraught and sensitive issue was very far from the minimum that a Palestinian would accept as a basis for discussion: During the course of the talks, former U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright could ask the Palestinians the seemingly innocent question: "Why don't you declare a state without Jerusalem?"; but Barak, had he been serious in aiming for an agreement, should not have allowed himself to bring up at the summit suggestions for a solution without Palestinian sovereignty over the parts of the city that are inhabited by Palestinians, including the Old City and its sites that are sacred to Muslims and Christians. The entire city will remain united and under Israeli sovereignty, the Palestinian side was told, and this was a sure recipe for failure. Barak ignored this and dragged everyone to the summit, as he was reminded by some of the American participants, who were often astounded by his move. Reading the book very much reinforces the impression that the intention was not to reach an agreement; it was of a different character entirely.
The prime minister could have found out for himself the red lines of the Palestinians concerning the mosque compound, or through Yossi Ginnosar, who had good connections with Arafat. He could also have turned to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, to hear from him what president Clinton had heard from him: "No Arab leader will dare accept such a responsibility (for the division of the Temple Mount - A.K.), because this could lead to dire result in the entire region." Barak did not take this into account and the relevant quotations cited in the book reinforce even more the sense that he was looking ahead to the stage after the-failure-that-was-known-in-advance, perhaps hoping for a "miracle," that is for Palestinian submission, but this is not how a serious leader behaves.
`Generous proposals'
Perhaps he hoped that the pressure from Clinton, which was strong and laced with threats ("You will lose the friendship of the United States," "You won't have a state" and more) would lead to an easy achievement, but this did not work.
Madeleine Albright, who does not come out well in the book, tries to tempt Arafat: "You will get economic and financial aid for the state that will be established" (without Jerusalem, of course - A.K.), and he, who by that stage already believed that this was not a negotiation but a "conspiracy," as he related afterward, answers her angrily: "When the state is established, the whole world will support it. I don't need your money." Another detail and another fact and you ask yourself: Was Barak really aiming for an agreement?
A few days after the failure of the summit, Ehud Barak met with Steve Cohen, an American academic who has devoted himself to activity for peace in our region since the 1980s. At the time it was said that the prime minister spoke to him more or less thus: Now I'm going to destroy the peace camp in Israel. In the book, the formulation is a bit less brutal: "I will see to it that the peace camp in Israel understands that an agreement with the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization is impossible, because everything has already been done to try to achieve it" (and in vain - A.K.). And indeed, an unprecedented propaganda campaign to delegitimize Arafat began immediately, attendant upon the presentation of a falsified picture of the "generous offers" that were rejected with a heavy hand. It is impossible to deny that here Barak chalked up a success, but the price is unbearably steep. Today there are enough tools to defeat the narrative of Ehud Barak and the Israeli right - and the book before us is an important contribution to this - but as long as the falsified version prevails, it is difficult for the peace-seekers to get off the ground.
Enderlin also deals with the Al-Aqsa Intifada. He describes the sequence of events in such a way that it is clear to the reader that Sharon's visit to the mosque compound is what ignited the conflagration, and the massive firing of live ammunition by the police at the demonstrators who protested against the visit the following day, after the Friday prayers, set the ground on fire. Former CIA head George Tenet said that Arafat lost control of his people, the Mitchell report called Sharon's visit a "provocation" and Barak stood his ground: Arafat is to blame. The latter stresses that he said to Barak, during his visit to his home in Kochav Yair, three days before Sharon made his pilgrimage to the Temple Mount: "You have to do everything to prevent the visit, because it could cause a catastrophe."
Lack of goodwill
Israelis who were there at Kochav Yair, says Enderlin, claim that Sharon's name never came up in the conversation. However, there was also a private talk between the two leaders only, the longest they ever held, during a walk in Barak's garden. Did Barak not hear a warning of what could be expected there either? And even if he did not hear this, did it not occur to him that the provocation could ignite a conflagration?
Four years earlier there had been a similar situation, when Benjamin Netanyahu opened the Western Wall tunnel. The Palestinians demonstrated and threw stones, the Israelis opened fire and killed people, and on the other side they also used live ammunition, and the balance of blood was heavy: 80 Palestinians and 15 Israeli soldiers killed; but with goodwill, relates Enderlin, Netanyahu and Arafat talk on the phone and then dine with Clinton and talk together, just the two of them, for four hours, in a separate room in the White House, and quiet returns. It apparently did not occur to Barak to get in touch with Arafat in order to try to put out the fire that Sharon's visit - which he had not prevented - ignited. Who knows: If in 1996 Barak had been prime minister and Sharon had been involved in the same shenanigans - the intifada might have already broken out then.
Here too, as with respect to the "generous proposals," as long as Barak's version prevails - and quite a few experts negate it - that Arafat sparked the intifada "because he does not recognize our rights" etc., the left will not be able to take off. This also applies to the demonization of Arafat since the failure of Camp David. The book, which also treats the period after the summit, does not omit this.
Barak made the most important contribution to Sharon's rise. After his failure, relates Enderlin, he asked foreign dignitaries whose names are not mentioned - but presumably there was at least one Frenchman among them - to lobby for his appointment as defense minister. "They all politely refused."
